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Ordinary Thinking about Time
John Campbell, Berkeley
1. Why do it the ordinary way?
I will describe two non-standard ways of thinking about time. Th e ﬁ rst is 
ubiquitous in animal cognition. I will call it ‘phase time’. Suppose for exam-
ple you consider a hibernating animal. Th is animal might have representa-
tion of the various seasons of the year, and modulate its actions dependent 
on the season. But it need have no distinction between the winter of one 
year and the winter of another; it thinks of time only in terms of repeatable 
phases.
Th e second non-standard way of thinking about time has been ascribed 
to children at an early stage in development. I will call it ‘script time’. A 
‘script’ or ‘schema’ is representation of the structure of a repeated type of 
event, such as going to a restaurant, attending a lecture or visiting the doc-
tor. You know what types of event happen in what order. And in script time, 
you identify temporal locations with respect to events in the script.
Within each of these ways of thinking of time there is a recognizable 
“earlier than” relation. In phase time, the relation is not transitive. In script 
time, the “earlier than” relation only holds between times within the same 
script. Both these ways of thinking of time contrast with our ordinary con-
ception.
It is not immediately obvious just how to draw the contrast. You might 
say that we ordinarily think of time as linear, so that “earlier than” is tran-
sitive and connected. Th at is certainly how our use of calendars and clocks 
suggests we think. But does our ordinary way of thinking of time in autobi-
ographical memory and in planning for the future demand the full strength 
of transitivity and connectedness?
Why do we use our ordinary way of thinking of time, rather than the non-
standard ways? You might say, “Th is is simply what we do”, and argue that no 
explanation can be given. I shall argue, though, that we can explain why we 
think of time as we do by looking at the way we make sense of the transmis-
sion of causal inﬂ uence from place to place by concrete objects. I begin by 
setting out the two non-standard ways of thinking of time in more detail.
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2. Phase time
Consider an animal using a circadian clock. Th e clock dictates when the an-
imal sleeps and wakes, when it feels hungry, and so on, for a number of rou-
tine procedures through which it goes every day. So far, though, we might 
have here only what we might call biological time. It is one thing for an ani-
mal to have biological mechanisms that are time-sensitive, another for it to 
have temporal cognition. A sun-ﬂ ower seed might germinate at a particular 
time of year; that does not of itself show that the seed is representing time. 
What does it take for an organism to have not merely biological, but cog-
nitive time? A natural answer is that it has to do with whether the animal 
can be viewed as performing computations over temporal representations 
(Gallistel 1990). Th e sunﬂ ower seed does not perform computations relat-
ing to the time of year. On the other hand a foraging bird, for example, de-
termining its rate of return for the time spent in a particular ﬁ eld, might be 
engaging in quite complex calculations concerning time. So if we consider 
an animal with a circadian clock, we can say that we have properly cogni-
tive time if we have an ability to use its temporal knowledge in ﬁ nding, for 
example, the optimum plan for the day, the optimum order in which to per-
form various tasks and how long to spend on them.
Th e agent knows what phase the day is currently at: whether it is ear-
ly, late or mid-morning, for example. And the agent may have discovered 
and stored information about what typically happens at various particular 
phases of the day — that breakfast is served at 10.00am on Forel’s balcony, 
for example. And the agent may put this stored information to use in guid-
ing action, as honeybees used to gather at Forel’s balcony at breakfast time 
(Gallistel 1990, 243). So the agent arrives for food at the right time of day, 
and leaves shortly afterwards. Notice, though, that the agent so far has only 
the conception of time as (repeatable) phase. Th e agent does not draw, and 
makes no use of, the distinction between the morning of one day and the 
morning of another.
Th e domain of times over which the agent’s temporal representations are 
deﬁ ned is oriented: adjacent times are ordered by “earlier than”. Early morn-
ing precedes mid-morning. But the domain is cyclically ordered, somewhat 
as places on the equator are cyclically ordered by “to the east of ”. Th e “earlier 
than” relation here is not transitive, just as “to the east of ” is not transitive.
To be able to use its circadian clock, there must be some sense in which 
the agent can use temporal indexicals: terms like “now” or “in a little while”. 
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Th e agent has to be able to represent, “it’s mid-morning now”, or “in a lit-
tle while it will be mid-morning”. Th e agent can do this by using indexicals 
which are governed by rules whose formal statement is exactly like that of 
the rules governing our ordinary temporal indexicals. Just as we have a term, 
“now”, whose reference is ﬁ xed by the rule I will call ‘Linear’:
Linear: Any token of “now” refers to the time at which it was produced,
so the agent will use a term “now” governed by the rule I will call ‘Phase’:
Phase: Any token of “now” refers to the time at which it was produced.
Th e similarity between the two rules, Linear and Phase, is I hope evident. 
Th e diﬀ erence between them is in the domain of times over which they are 
deﬁ ned. Linear is deﬁ ned over the everyday domain of unrepeatable mo-
ments, linearly ordered by “earlier than”. Phase, on the other hand, is deﬁ ned 
over the domain of phases, such as “early morning” “mid-morning” and so 
on, which are cyclically ordered by “earlier than”. Despite this diﬀ erence, a 
system of indexicals governed by rules such as Phase, will serve the animal 
for practical purposes — planning, action and so on — somewhat as our or-
dinary indexicals, deﬁ ned over a domain of linearly organized times, serve 
us. Th ere surely is a sense in which indexicals are essential (Perry 1979), but 
indexicals governed by rules deﬁ ned over domains of phase times will do; it 
is not essential that we have indexicals governed by rules deﬁ ned over do-
mains of linearly organized times.
Th ere seems, indeed, to be no reason why we could not have, within phase 
time, temporal operators for which we need Reichenbach’s distinction be-
tween time of utterance, reference time and event time (Reichenbach 1947). 
It is just that again, the domain of times over which the notions are deﬁ ned 
will be a domain of phases. And the “earlier than” relation will be a rela-
tion deﬁ ned over times as phases. So we could have representations such as 
“when X happens, Y will have happened already”. Here the opening clause 
deﬁ nes the reference time, with respect to which the event Y is then tem-
porally located. So it is not just that we can have rudimentary indexicals in 
phase time; we can have a relatively sophisticated set of tenses and temporal 
operators.
One way to bring out the diﬀ erence between an agent operating with 
phase times and an agent operating with linear time is to remark that there 
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is a sense in which the agent operating with phase times does not have an 
authentic past tense. Th e agent can indeed have an operator, “in the past, 
___”, governed by a rule:
“In the past, ___” is true if at some time earlier than the time of utterance, 
___.
But there is a sense in which this is not an authentic past tense, as I will 
now explain. Th ere are some types of event that I am powerless to aﬀ ect: the 
weather, the tides, the rise of hip-hop, and so on. I am no more able to af-
fect tomorrow’s weather than I am to aﬀ ect yesterday’s weather. When you 
and I speak of events in the past, however, there is a sense in which their 
temporal location alone renders them insusceptible to being aﬀ ected by us. 
Past events may be events of types that, in general, I am able to aﬀ ect. What 
I have for breakfast is, within limits, something over which I have a lot of 
control each day. But I cannot now aﬀ ect what I had for breakfast yesterday. 
Th is is not a matter of the event being of a type that I am in general unable 
to aﬀ ect. It has to do entirely with the event being past; or, if you prefer, with 
the event being earlier than the time at which I am attempting to act.
No such conception of the past is available to an agent with only the con-
ception of time as phase. Suppose as before that I am able to aﬀ ect what 
is for breakfast. Whether there is marmalade for breakfast at 10.00 am is 
then something that I can aﬀ ect. Just after breakfast on one morning, I can 
think, “breakfast is just over”. Early the next morning I will be able to think, 
“Breakfast is just about to come up”. But the only conception I have of there 
being marmalade for breakfast is the conception of a state of aﬀ airs I am 
currently able to change. I can think of there being marmalade for breakfast 
at 10.00 am; but that is the state of aﬀ airs I am currently able to change. I 
can aﬀ ect whether there is, in general, marmalade for breakfast at 10.00 am. 
I can’t now aﬀ ect whether there was marmalade for breakfast yesterday at 
10.00 am. But that conception of a particular, unrepeatable time, yesterday 
at 10.00 am, is just what is not available to an agent who has only the con-
ception of time as phase.
You might argue that the agent may have the episodic memory of yester-
day’s marmalade at breakfast, a memory of that particular event, which is 
indeed unchangeable by the agent now. My present point, however, is that 
the agent does not have the conception of the temporal location of the event 
as that which makes the event incapable of being aﬀ ected by the agent now; 
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and that point remains even if the agent does have, say, a memory-image of 
yesterday’s event. However, once this point is grasped, it seems questionable 
whether the agent could be said to have a truly episodic memory of that in-
dividual event, since the agent does not have the conception of the event as 
having a particular temporal location. It is not just that the agent does not 
know exactly when the past event occurred. Rather, the agent does not even 
have the conception of there being a particular time at which the past event 
occurred. In what sense then does the agent have the conception of this as 
a particular event at all?
So much, for the moment, for the conception of time as phase. As I said, 
this conception is ubiquitous in animal cognition. It is usually said that only 
humans have the conception of time as linear. But animal timing is com-
monplace. And one element in animal’s representation of time is the repre-
sentation of phase time. Th is is what I have been trying to characterize.
3. Script time
 Young children seem able to form and retain information about the tem-
poral structure of observed sequences. For example, there are cases of de-
ferred imitation, in which children can repeat observed action sequences 
after a delay. McCormack and Hoerl (1999) make the point that the infor-
mation retained here may be, as they say, generic, rather than relating to the 
temporal relations between the speciﬁ c events observed. Th e information 
is generic in that it is “information about a temporal structure numerically 
diﬀ erent event sequences may have and which, therefore, does not distin-
guish between one event sequence and another.” (McCormack and Hoerl 
1999, 158). So there is a sense in which the child has learned from observa-
tion of the past events, but what the child has may be generic information, 
rather than episodic memory of the particular events initially observed, and 
the temporal relations among them.
McCormack and Hoerl describe this type of generic memory as involving 
the construction of scripts, in something like the sense of Schank and Abel-
son (1977); cf also Nelson (1986). A script represents what usually happens 
in a situation in which there is a well-established pattern to what happens, 
such as going to a seminar, visiting a doctor, or eating in a restaurant. Hav-
ing a script is having a representation that can, as it were, talk you through 
the situation. McCormack and Hoerl propose that scripts function as ‘tem-
poral frameworks’ for young children. Th ey provide ways of representing the 
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temporal locations of novel events. You may recognize a sequence of events 
as falling under a script even if it contains some unexpected elements; the 
script itself provides a framework of times with respect to which the tem-
poral locations of the unexpected elements can be plotted.
As McCormack and Hoerl stress, there is a sense in which the framework 
provided by a script is non-perspectival: scripts do not of themselves locate 
events with respect to one’s present temporal position. However, here as in 
the case of phase time, perspectival representations will be needed if the 
temporal framework is to be put to use in practice. How are we to ﬁ nd the 
temporal token-reﬂ exives that we will need to express a perspectival repre-
sentation of time? We might use terms such as “now”, governed by the rule:
Script: Any token of “now” refers to the time at which it was produced.
Th e domain of times over which this rule is deﬁ ned will not, of course, be 
times drawn from our ordinary range of linearly organised times; they will 
themselves be times deﬁ ned in terms of the temporal framework provided 
by the script. Within each script times are temporally related; but we cannot 
express temporal relations between times identiﬁ ed in diﬀ erent scripts.
In virtue of what do we have our ordinary understanding of temporal in-
dexicals, rather than a more primitive conception? McCormack and Hoerl 
suggest that the key diﬀ erence here, the marker of a mature grasp of tem-
poral indexicals, is a certain capacity for temporal decentring, “where decen-
tring means being able to conceive of other times as aﬀ ording alternative 
temporal perspectives.” (p. 171).
Th ey ﬁ rst describe a simple type of temporal decentring, which is not 
enough for the ordinary conception of time. Th is kind of decentring is put 
to work in understanding any use of the present tense to refer to a time 
other than the time at which the understanding takes place. Th is kind of 
decentring is used by any child who manages to follow a narrative begin-
ning with the words, “Once …” or “One day …”, followed by quotations 
of present-tense utterances. For example, if I say, “Once, as I stood in line, 
someone said to me, ‘you’re standing on my foot’”, anyone following the 
narrative has to interpret the quoted present-tense utterance “You’re stand-
ing on my foot” as relating to a time other than the time at which they are 
hearing the narrative.
McCormack and Hoerl suggest that this simple decentring can be de-
scribed as form of perspective-switching, in that the child who can do this 
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may not so much as be able to make sense of the question what temporal 
relations hold between the various perspectives themselves. At this stage all 
the child has is the ability to switch from one script-time to another script-
time, and may have no ability to inquire into the temporal relations between 
the various script times. Th ey say:
We wish to suggest that temporal decentring, if it is to be more than the 
perspective-switching described above, must similarly involve a concep-
tion of temporal perspectives as perspectives onto the same temporal real-
ity and an understanding of the systematic relations that obtain between 
diﬀ erent temporal perspectives in virtue of this fact. Understanding that 
there can be multiple temporal perspectives onto the same event, for ex-
ample, involves being able to reason that a current ongoing event will be 
in the past from the perspective of subsequent days and was in the future 
from the perspective of previous days. (p. 174)
And it is in virtue of our possession of this richer capacity for temporal de-
centring, they suggest, that we can be said to have the mature conception of 
time. In the terms I suggested, their proposal is that it is this richer capacity 
for temporal decentring that constitutes operating with our ordinary under-
standing of temporal indexicals, rather than the more primitive indexicals I 
have been describing.
It seems to me that there is a role for temporal decentring in an analysis 
of our ordinary understanding of time, but that this approach does not iden-
tify that role correctly. For example, consider an agent who does not have 
our ordinary conception of time, but does have the conception of phase 
time, as well as various scripts. It would be possible to have the conception 
of a single network of phases onto which all scripts could be plotted. For 
instance, suppose our agent has the conception of the various phases of the 
day: morning, afternoon, evening and night, and perhaps divides them into 
early morning, mid-morning, late morning and so on. Such an agent might 
be unable to distinguish the times of one day from the times of another 
day; this agent can only talk and think about those phases. In eﬀ ect, this 
agent has a single script for the day, onto which all events are plotted. So 
this agent would not be operating with a range of more or less specialized 
scripts, just a single general-purpose script for a typical day. Such an agent 
would be capable of decentring in the simple sense: this agent could decen-
tre to consider what happens in the early morning or in the mid-afternoon, 
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for example, and this agent could interpret present-tense utterances consid-
ered as made at those times. But our agent could also consider the temporal 
relations between those various phase-times; our agent could reﬂ ect on the 
relation between early morning and mid-afternoon, for instance, reﬂ ecting 
on the intervening phases of mid- and late-morning, and early afternoon. 
So this subject would meet the McCormack/Hoerl characterisation of rich 
decentring, without yet having our ordinary understanding of temporal in-
dexicals. It therefore does not seem that it could be the capacity for rich de-
centring that explains our ordinary understanding of temporal indexicals.
4. Causation and physical objects
It is natural to suspect that what is missing here is an understanding of the 
relation between grasp of our ordinary conception of time and a grasp of 
causal concepts. I want to approach this question in terms of the interven-
tionist approach to causation developed by a number of authors (Pearl 2000, 
Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993, Woodward 2003). Th e idea here is 
that for a variable X to be a cause of Y is for intervening on X to be a way 
of intervening on Y. We can explain this more explicitly by introducing the 
notion of an ‘intervention’ variable (Woodward and Hitchcock 2003). For I 
to be an intervention variable for X with respect to Y, it must be that:
I causally aﬀ ects X.
I does not causally aﬀ ect Y otherwise than by aﬀ ecting X.
I is not correlated with any variable Z that is correlated with Y through a 
route that excludes X.
I suspends any other variable from aﬀ ecting the value of X.
Suppose all these conditions are met by the intervention variable. Suppose 
that X remains correlated with Y under interventions on X. Th e correlation 
then cannot be due to some common cause of X and Y; the conditions above 
exclude that possibility. So it can only mean that there is a causal connection 
between X and Y. Th e interventionist says: for X to be a cause of Y is for X 
and Y to be correlated under interventions on X. Or to put it another way, 
for X to be a cause of Y is for intervening on X to be a way of intervening 
on Y.
Th is characterization of causation itself makes free use of the notion of 
cause. Th at does not mean that the characterization is trivial. It does not 
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merely explain “X causes Y ” in terms of the idea that X causes Y; on the con-
trary, it does not appeal at all to the idea of a causal connection speciﬁ cally 
between X and Y. Th e fact that the characterization itself uses the notion of 
cause does, however, mean that there is a question whether it makes explicit 
all the ideas that are required for an ordinary understanding of causation. In 
particular, it leaves it open whether an understanding of temporal concepts 
is required for a grasp of causation; and if so, what kind of temporal con-
cepts. I want to end with some remarks on this.
Th e interventionist account is a counterfactual account; if it were a reduc-
tionist counterfactual account in the style of Lewis, it is hard to see how it 
could avoid using temporal concepts at some point. If we explain “X causes 
Y ” by saying that there are counterfactual circumstances in which a diﬀ er-
ence in X would make a diﬀ erence to Y, we have to say just which kind of 
circumstances we have in mind. For a Lewis-style account, an appeal to 
time will be needed to specify just what we have to hold constant and what 
we are varying. So we might say that we will hold constant everything about 
the way the world is up until the time at which there is a diﬀ erence in X. 
And here we really will need the ordinary notion of time, not merely phase 
time or script time. Because the interventionist account claims the right to 
make free use of the notion of cause in characterizing cause, however, the 
interventionist has another way of saying what is to be held constant and 
what varied when the value of X changes. Th at is exactly what is achieved 
by the four conditions I quoted above. And there is here no explicit appeal 
to temporal notions. In explaining what it is for an ordinary subject to have 
grasped these four conditions, it will be natural at some point to appeal to 
the subject’s own capacity for agency, a tendency in some situations to re-
gard one’s own actions as interventions (Gopnik et. al. 2004). But this kind 
of approach needs to appeal only to the subject’s sensitivity to the causal re-
lations in which her own actions stand to other phenomena. It does not, on 
the face of it anyhow, have to appeal to the subject’s grasp of time at all.
Suppose, though, that we look at the details of our ordinary understand-
ing of how causal inﬂ uence is transmitted from place to place by physical 
objects. It is really basic to our understanding of ourselves as spatially lo-
cated that what happens at one place can have repercussions for what hap-
pens at other places. Places are not causally insulated from one another. But 
neither are places promiscuously related by causation. It is not as if what 
happens at any one place aﬀ ects any arbitrary range of other places. So how 
is causal inﬂ uence transmitted from place to place? If you think about the 
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surface of a pond, you might think of waves fanning out from one place to 
another set of locations, and causal inﬂ uence being transmitted in that way. 
But there is another way of thinking that we often use. We think that causal 
inﬂ uence is transmitted from place to place by the movement of objects. I 
light an oil heater in the garden and then ﬁ nd it’s cold indoors, so I bring 
the heater in. Because of the movement of the heater, my intervention, my 
lighting of the gas at one place, makes a diﬀ erence to the temperature at 
another place. We would be baﬄ  ed by the idea that my lighting the heater 
outside could have made a diﬀ erence to the temperature of the room with-
out the heater having been moved, unless of course we appeal to some other 
story about heat waves or the motion of molecules. Th e movement of the 
physical thing, the oil heater, explains how it is that my intervention outside 
is making a diﬀ erence to the temperature inside. Th is implies:
(a) there is more to the movement of a physical object than there being 
correlations under interventions between what goes on at one place and 
what goes on at another, and
(b) this further sameness of physical object at one place with physical ob-
ject at another place is what explains the existence of those correlations 
between what goes on at one place and what goes on at the other, under 
interventions at one of the places.
We could sum all this up by saying that there is more to our ordinary con-
cept of causation than the interventionist account allows. In addition to the 
fact that an intervention on one variable makes a diﬀ erence to the value of 
another, we think there is, in many cases, a mechanism by which this hap-
pens. Ordinary physical objects are just the very simplest examples of such 
mechanisms. An intervention at one location can make a diﬀ erence at an-
other location; and movement of the object from one location to another is 
the mechanism by which this transmission of inﬂ uence from one location 
to another is achieved.
It is this dimension of our ordinary understanding of causation that de-
mands the ordinary conception of time. Suppose we have an intelligent 
agent operating with phase time only, making no distinction between one 
morning and another. An object may be observed one morning to be G 
when the previous morning it had been observed to be F. And our agent 
can recognize a counterfactual dependence of the G-ness on the F-ness of 
that object. If there had been an intervention on the F-ness of the object, it 
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would not be G. As I said, formulating this kind of counterfactual does not 
seem to require use of temporal ideas. What our agent cannot do is identify 
the ground of the counterfactual dependence. For the ground of the coun-
terfactual is the persisting object itself, transmitting causal inﬂ uence from 
its earlier place to its present place. Recognizing that temporal relation de-
mands that our agent go beyond the conﬁ nes of phase time, towards some-
thing more like our ordinary thinking about time.
Consider now an intelligent agent using only script time. In running a 
number of scripts over a period of time, the agent may ﬁ nd that one and the 
same object is encountered in the course of many diﬀ erent scripts: a par-
ent, for example, may ﬁ gure in trips to the doctor, restaurant and so on. And 
the behavior of that thing in the running of one script may counterfactually 
depend on what happened in the running of another script. Merely stating 
the counterfactual dependence, if this is done in interventionist terms, does 
not require the use of temporal concepts. But recognizing the ground of 
the counterfactual connection, in the persistence of the object that ﬁ gures 
in the running of one script to its ﬁ guring in the running of another script, 
requires recognizing temporal relations that go across scripts. So we have to 
move away from the series of temporal islands provided by script time, to a 
more connected conception of time.
Th is is not to say that recognizing the role of persisting physical objects 
as the mechanisms that transmit causal inﬂ uence from place to place will 
demand the full strength of the conception of time as linear. When the in-
troduction of a calendar and clock system makes linearity explicit, this is a 
bold, simple stroke that clariﬁ es our thinking about time. But the pressure 
to recognize transitivity and connectedness is already there when we con-
sider the temporal structure that has to be recognized by a self-conscious 
agent. In general, we believe in the transitivity of the connectedness of the 
self, in this sense: if an intervention on the self ’s F-ness would have made 
a diﬀ erence to its G-ness, and an intervention on the self ’s G-ness would 
have made a diﬀ erence to its H-ness, then an intervention on the self ’s F-
ness would have made a diﬀ erence to its H-ness. And we think of the self as 
a concrete object that transmits causal inﬂ uence from every place remem-
bered to every place remembered or anticipated. Th is is a special case, albeit 
a particularly striking one, of the general point that it is our conception of 
the causal roles of concrete objects that explains the structure of our ordi-
nary understanding of time.
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